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COMMENT
HOLDING STATE SOVEREIGNS ACCOUNTABLE FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: APPLYING THE ACT OF STATE
DOCTRINE CONSISTENTLY WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
On March 24, 1999, six of seven Law Lords in the English House
of Lords found that General Pinochet, former head of state of Chile, was
not immune from prosecution for his part in the torture of Chilean citi-
zens during his reign.1 The Law Lords applied the act of state doctrine to
international agreements, treaties, and English statutes pertaining to the
crime of torture.2 This decision was the first to offer such a dramatic cut-
ting back of the traditional rule of absolute immunity regarding criminal
prosecution. Although exceptions to the act of state doctrine have existed
for several years pertaining to civil suits regarding acts committed by a
sovereign, this was the first time that a foreign court determined that
sovereign immunity was not a bar to criminal prosecution for acts com-
mited by a head of state.3 This paper will argue that the act of state doc-
trine should not be used as a shield to protect heads of states from crimi-
nal prosecution for serious abuses of human rights.
II. THIE BIRTH OF A NEW ERA
International law concerning human rights violations developed with
rapid speed following the prosecution of several high ranking Nazi of-
ficers for the atrocities committed during the Holocaust.4 The Nuremberg
Trials began in 1945, when the international community for the first time
1. R v. Bartle and Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and Others, ex parte
Pinochet, (H.L. 1999) [hereinafter ex parte Pinochet 1999].
2. See id. Specifically the Law Lords addressed the United Nations Convention for
the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, The Euro-
pean Convention regarding torture and the Criminal Justice Act of 1988. All of these will
be discussed in greater detail in this paper.
3. See, e.g., the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1602.
4. Lara Leibman, Note, From Nuremberg to Bosnia: Consistent Application of Inter-
national Law, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 705 (1994). See also, International Law and Human
Right Edition: Revisiting a Conference Commemorating the Nuremberg Trials: A Com-
mentary from a Nuremberg Prosecutor. An Introduction by Arthur L. Benney. 17 B. C.
TnRD WORLD L. J. 275 (1997) (casualties from the Holocaust included six million Euro-
pean Jews, gypsies, homosexuals, mentally ill persons and non-combatant Russians and
Slavs).
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held state leaders responsible for violations of human rights committed
within their state against their own people.5 Over the next fifty years sev-
eral conventions and commissions spearheaded by the United Nations
were created to formalize the new commitment of the international com-
munity to preventing further abuses of human rights. 6 One important ob-
jective of these commissions was to create a duty on the part of its mem-
bers to prevent and punish abuses of human rights wherever they may
occur.
7
These conventions and commissions were put to the test before the
Law Lords of England when they were asked to decide whether Spain
could extradite former Chile Head of State, Augusto Pinochet Ugarte
from England. Pinochet was arrested in London on October 17, 1998
when Baltazar Garzon Real, a judge sitting on the Spanish National High
Court, filed a formal request to question him, called a commission
rogatoire.8 Within weeks the Spanish National Court ruled that Spain had
the right to seek the extradition of Pinochet, and a formal request for ex-
tradition was filed.9 The Spanish warrant accused General Pinochet of us-
ing the power of the State to commit thousands of violations of human
rights.'0 On October 28, 1998, England's High Court declared Pinochet's
detention to be unlawful, holding that under the act of state doctrine, he
was entitled to sovereign immunity as a former head of state.' A quick
5. Id. This was also the first time that military, political and financial leaders of a
country were held criminally liable for violations of international law. Benney, supra note
4, at 275.
6. Marlise Simons, Judges in Spain Assert Pinochet Can Face Trial, THE NEW
YORK TI mS, Oct. 31, 1998, at A6. This comment focuses on the Convention for the Pre-
vention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the Interna-
tional Convention Against the Taking of Hostages. It is important to be aware that con-
ventions address practices that are already recognized as being outlawed by the
international community and serve only to strengthen the international commitment to
preventing such acts. In addition, the conventions are directed at such acts insofar as they
are committed by persons who hold some sort of official responsibility or capacity. J.
HERMAN BURGERS AND HANS DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST TOR-
TURE 1 (1988). See infra notes 82-88 and accompanying text for more information regard-
ing the United Nations Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrad-
ing Treatment or Punishment and the Convention Against the Taking of Hostages.
7. Both Spain and England are parties to these conventions. Id.
8. Pinochet Decision - The Birth of a New Era for Human Rights, M2 Presswire
(Amnesty International), Dec. 10, 1998.
9. Simons, supra note 3, at A6. The Spanish National Court is Spain's second high-
est tribunal, but no appeal was possible in this case.
10. Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and Others, ex parte
Pinochet Ugarte, 3 W.L.R. 1456 (H.L. 1998) [hereinafter ex parte Pinochet 1998].
11. Id. at 1457.
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appeal followed resulting in the reversal of the High Court's ruling.1 2 In a
decision hailed as "the birth of a new era for human rights," England's
House of Lords held that Pinochet was not entitled to sovereign immu-
nity as a former head of state.' 3
This new era was eclipsed when little more than a month later the
House of Lords, in an unprecedented decision, set aside the ruling of the
Law Lords and scheduled a rehearing of Pinochet's case.' 4 This landmark
reversal occurred after it was revealed that one of the Law Lords, Leo-
nard Hoffman, who voted against sovereign immunity, and his wife had
close links to Amnesty International, one of the intervening parties. 5
On March 24, 1999, the House of Lords rendered a decision that,
although still a victory for human rights, cut back on the previous, more
general denial of immunity to General Pinochet. 16 Rather than focusing
on whether Pinochet was entitled to immunity, the new decision focused
on when, if at all, such immunity applied. 17 The Law Lords examined the
dates the alleged violations occurred in conjunction with the dates of the
passage of English statutes which would permit prosecution for such ac-
tions.18 In the end, the Law Lords determined that Pinochet could only be
denied immunity for the acts of torture that were committed after the
passage of the Criminal Justice Act of 1988, and after England's ratifica-
tion of the Torture Convention on December 8, 1988.19
Ill. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES TO HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
A. The Classic Paradigm for Responding to Human Rights
Violations
The Nuremberg Trials held after the fall of Adolf Hitler's Nazi re-
gime established the classic response to violations of human rights - the
criminal prosecution. 20 Criminal prosecution serves the dual purpose of
12. Pinochet Decision - The Birth of a New Era for Human Rights, supra note 8.
13. Id. See also ex pane Pinochet 1998, supra note 10.
14. Kevin Cullen, British Court Reverses Itself Gives Pinochet a New Chance -
One Jurist Faulted on Potential Conflict, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 18, 1998, at A26.
15. Id.
16. ex parte Pinochet 1999, supra note 1.
17. See id. See also ex parte Pinochet 1998, supra note 10 (arguing that violations
of human rights are never valid acts of a head of state that would give rist to soveriegn
immunity).
18. See ex parte Pinochet 1999, supra note 1.
19. See id.
20. Stephan Landsman, Accountability for International Crime and Serious Viola-
tions of Fundamental Human Rights: Alternative Responses to Serious Human Rights
Abuses: of Prosecution and Truth Conventions, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 81, 81 (Au-
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punishing human rights violators and preserving for posterity a documen-
tation of the atrocities that were committed.21 Holding human rights vio-
lators liable through prosecution sends a clear message that respect for,
and adherence to, the rule of law is imperative. 22 It also serves to inform
and educate the populace as to the true extent of the acts that have been
committed.23 The record produced by the criminal process also provides a
basis for compensation of victims and their families because it reveals
the names of victims, the crimes that were committed against them, and
the persons responsible.24 In addition, the punishment meted out satisfies
the public's need for retribution and the victim's need for vengeance.
25
The criminal process also deters future violations and may contribute to
the healing of social wounds caused by human rights violations. 26
Although there are other alternatives to criminal prosecution for
human rights violations, the criminal trial has served as the model re-
sponse ever since the Nuremberg trials of the 1940s. 27 In the face of seri-
ous human rights violations, the international community should question
the decision of any nation not to prosecute.28 Certain violations of human
rights have been advanced as always requiring criminal prosecution. 29
Among such violations are acts of genocide and those committed against
citizens of foreign states.30
B. Truth Conventions-A Practical Alternative
When criminal prosecution is not a feasible option, truth conven-
tions are frequently utilized to respond to human rights violations. 31 In-
tumn 1996).
21. Id. Criminal trials that prosecute and memorialize at the same time have proven
to be an attractive response by the international community to human rights violations.
Most recently, the United Nations utilized criminal prosecution in addressing the atroci-
ties committed in Bosnia and Rwanda. Id. at 81-82.
22. Id. at 83.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 84.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 87. It has also been argued that the Nuremberg Trials are considered to be
an unusual case because of the total defeat and surrender of the Nazi's, the need for the
reconstruction of German society, and the history of show trials or allegiance to trial for-
mat that existed in several of the victors' nations. These factors cast doubt on the
"universality of the Nuremberg paradigm." Id.
28. Id. at 89.
29. Id. at 90.
30. Id. Certain treaties create the obligation to prosecute these violations. Id.
31. Id. at 82. The truth convention has been used over twenty times over the past
twenty-five years. Most notably are the truth conventions of Uruguay, Germany, Chad,
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stead of prosecuting, the truth convention investigates the incidents and
publishes the circumstances that surrounded what actually occurred, who
was responsible, and what the motives were behind the violations. 32 Pos-
sible goals of a truth commission include: reconciliation of different fac-
tions, closure of an oppressive past to move the country beyond it, vindi-
cation of victims through official acknowledgment of their stories,
forgiveness by victims, confession by perpetrators, and some of the aims
of criminal prosecution such as retribution and deterrence. 33 One univer-
sal goal is to memorialize for future generations the atrocities that were
committed in an effort to prevent any further violations.34
Truth conventions are a better response to human rights violations
committed by a prior regime when prosecution may endanger the stabil-
ity of a newly formed democratic government 35 The threat of unfair tri-
als may also render prosecution impracticable, especially when military
rule has infiltrated the judicial system creating a disillusion with it by the
public. 36 Truth conventions offer speedy results in contrast with long
drawn out trials that may last for several years.37 The possible backlash
that may be created by unpopular court decisions are also avoided by
truth conventions. This can be extremely important to a new, weak, dem-
ocratic government whose existence may depend upon the compliance of
and South America. Id.
32. Id. Truth commissions conducted in various countries have varied significantly
with respect to the extent of investigative authority, modes of conducting hearings, and
the publication of the final report. The Argentinean Nunca Mas became a best seller. The
Chilean report was sent to each named victim's family. In contrast, Brazil's full report
saw limited circulation while a summary of the report was given mass distribution. Ger-
many took an entirely different approach to truth telling. East Germany's secret police
files were opened so that victims of abuse could discover the identity of their informers.
Henry Steiner, Introduction to HARVARD LAW SCHOOL HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRAM, INTER-
DISCIPLINARY DISCUSSION, TRUTH COMMISSIONS: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT 8-9 (1997)
[hereinafter TRUTH COMMISSIONS: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT].
33. Id. at 11.
34. Milan Kundera addressed the problem of international amnesia in The Book of
Laughter and Forgetting:
The bloody massacre in Bangladesh quickly covered over the memory of the
Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia, the assassination of Allende drowned out
the groans of Bangladesh, the war in the Sinai Desert made people forget about
Allende, the Cambodian massacre made people forget about Sinai. And so on
and so forth, until ultimately everyone lets everything be forgotten.
TRUTH COMMISSIONS: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT, supra note 32, at 14 (quoting MILAN
KUNDERA, THE BOOK OF LAUGHTER AND FORGETrING 7 (Michael and Henry Heim trans.,
New York, Knopf, 1980).
35. Landsman, supra note 20, at 84.
36. Id. at 85.
37. Id.
1999]
192 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE
the military.38
One drawback of the truth commission is that it does not satisfy the
policy goals that punishment does, such as retribution and vengeance.39
In contrast with the goals of the criminal procedure, truth commissions
do not seek punishment and often trade immunity to violators in ex-
change for information. 40 Before a truth commission is implemented as
an alternative to a criminal proceeding certain criterion must be satis-
fied.41 The public must support its use, it must be capable of conducting
a thorough and effective investigation into the violations, and it must also
provide a system to identify and provide compensation to victims. 42 The
legitimacy of a truth commission depends upon the satisfaction of these
criterion and on its independence from political pressure.
43
C. The Chilean Truth Commission
In 1989, Patricio Aylwin became the first democratically elected
President of Chile since Pinochet's military junta overthrew President Al-
lende's administration in 1973. 4 One of President Aylwin's first official
acts was to create the National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation
to investigate the acts of the prior regime in an effort to establish the
State's acknowledgment of the violations committed. 45 Aylwin's decree
states its purpose to be the clarification of the truth about the human
rights violations committed in Chile and abroad by the Chilean govern-
ment.46 The decree emphasized that the commission was created to bring
38. Id.
39. Id. at 88.
40. Id at 89. It has also been argued that truth commissions may achieve punishment
like results if the violators are ostracized as a result of the report. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 89-90. It is argued that the truth commission alternative should be rejected
if : "(1) the commission is not structured to make a thorough inquiry or exacerbates de-
lay; (2) compensation is not paid to victims; (3) the-commission is not the product of
democratic decision-making; (4) the commission does not yield at least four of the six
benefits of prosecution . . . ; and (5) exigent social, economic, or political factors make
more complete compliance impossible." Id. at 90.
43. Id. at 89.
44. Edward C. Snyder, The Dirty Legal War: Human Rights and the Rule of Law in
Chile 1973-1995, 2 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L. 253 (1995).
45. Robert J. Quinn, Note: Will the Rule of Law End? Challenging Grants of Am-
nesty for the Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime: Chile's New Model, 62 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 905, 954 (1994). The Presidential decree was necessary because Aylwin did
not have the requisite votes in Congress to approve the creation of the truth commission.
TRUTH COMMISSIONS: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT, supra note 32, at 51.
46. REPORT OF THE CHILEAN NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION
6 (Phillip E. Berryman trans., University of Notre Dame Press, 1993) [hereinafter RE-
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the country together through an official recognition of the truth, and not
for the purpose of bringing about any legal proceedings related to any of-
fenses. 47 In addition, the commission was not to interfere in any cases
pending or to reach any legal conclusions as to responsibility for any
human rights violations.48 The Commission conducted a year long inves-
tigation before releasing a report that was critical both of the Allende re-
gime and Pinochet's junta.4 9
In Chile, the truth commission was a better alternative to a criminal
proceeding for several reasons. First, the military was still an imposing
force despite the election of Aylwin as President. 50 It was unlikely that
the military influence exerted over the judiciary would permit a fair trial
of the perpetrators in Chile.51 Secondly, an unpopular decision was capa-
ble of threatening the stability of the newly elected democratic adminis-
tration of President Aylwin. 52 Most importantly, the Amnesty Laws
passed by Pinochet provided a barricade which prevented criminal pro-
ceedings against most of the persons involved in the human rights viola-
tions. 53 The military had effectively shielded itself from any liability for
the acts that were committed.
IV. THE CASE AGAINST PINOCHET
The Spanish warrant issued by Judge Baltasar Garzon Real accused
Pinochet of masterminding a plan to eliminate Chilean, Argentinian and
Spanish citizens who fled Chile after the coup that brought Pinochet into
PORT). Rather than criticizing or trying to lay blame for the situation which led to the vio-
lation of human rights, the Chilean commission focused on the facts. The commission at-
tempted to show that the polarization of political life in Chile resulted in the
dehumanization of opponents, opening the door to the denial of human rights. TRUTH
COMMISSIONS: A COMPARATIVE AssEssMENT, supra note 32, at 21.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 7.
49. Snyder, supra note 44, at *28. Pinochet publicly attacked the report, warning
that "the Army of Chile solemnly declares that it will not accept being placed as if on
trial before the citizenry for having saved the freedom and sovereignty of the homeland
at the insistence of the civilian population." Id. at *28-*29.
50. General Pinochet has threatened the rule of law on several different occasions.
Snyder, supra note 44, at *35-*36.
51. Pinochet appointed ten out of the seventeen judges who are currently sitting on
Chile's Supreme Court. Id. at *31.
52. Pinochet has stood by any and all acts of his soldiers and has threatened the sta-
bility of the government if any of his soldiers are held accountable for their actions. Id. at
*36.
53. See infra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
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power in 1973.54 The Spanish court ruling that Pinochet could be extra-
dited was based on Spanish and international law that has developed
since the Nuremberg Charter, including the United Nations conventions
against torture and hostage-taking.5 Garzon has charged Pinochet with
crimes against humanity that were committed during his seventeen year
reign, including the murder of almost 4,300 people and the imprisonment
and torture of many thousands of others.56
A. The Violent Overthrow of the Government and the Creation of
the DINA
On September 11, 1973, the Chilean Armed Forces, led by General
Pinochet, overthrew the democratically elected government of Salvatore
Allende.5 7 For the ensuing seventeen years Pinochet's military junta ruled
Chile with an iron fist, suppressing the rule of law through the passage
of a series of decrees.5 8 Some of the early acts of the junta included sev-
eral decrees which appointed Pinochet as the President, stated that the
military overthrew the democratic government in order to restore the rule
of law that had been suppressed under Allende, declared a state of siege
which allowed the military to exercise jurisdiction over civilians, ex-
panded the use of the death penalty and declared a state of emergency.59
Decree No.521 established the Directorate of National Intelligence [here-
inafter DINA] in June 1974 to eliminate all political parties and any op-
position to the military junta.6°
The military government supported the existence of the DINA
through its contention that Chile was at war with "an insidious, subver-
54. Clifford Krauss, For the Bereft in Chile, a Cause for Tears: Pinochet Could Slip
Spain's Grasp, THE NEW YoRK TIMs, Oct. 30, 1998, at A6. Pinochet's plan to eliminate
the citizens who fled the country was called Operation Condor, the mostly closely kept
secret of Pinochet's administration. In 1991, the secret operation was disclosed by a Chil-
ean commission that documented the disappearance of over 3,000 Chileans but did not
name the officers responsible. Id.
55. ex parte Pinochet 1998, supra note 10, at 1500.
56. Id.
57. Quinn, supra note 45, at 905.
58. Id. A decree law is a norm dictated by a de facto government which was not
constitutionally established and assumed the power of the legislative branch. REPORT,
supra note 46, at 74 note j.
59. Snyder, supra note 44, at *6. All of the state powers were consolidated in Gen-
eral Pinochet who first held the office of Commander in Chief of the Army and Supreme
Commander of the Nation, and then President of the Republic. Quinn, supra note 45, at
912.
60. Snyder, supra note 44, at *8.
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sive enemy."' 61 The REPORT rejects this contention, finding that with the
exception of a few uprisings occurring almost contemporaneously with
the coup d'etat, the military government effectively exercised control
over the government. 62 Articles 9, 10, and 11 of the decree law that cre-
ated DINA were not made public. 63 Only later was the public made
aware that these articles allowed the DINA to utilize the armed forces in-
telligence agencies and to conduct raids and arrests. 64 In furtherance of
its goals, the DINA seized and held citizens without warrants for long
periods of time, during which citizens were subject to interrogation, tor-
ture, summary executions and forced exile.65 During the first four months
of the military regime, the DINA was responsible for the murders of at
least 1213 people and another 599 between January 1974 and August
1977.66
B. Torture Techniques Utilized by the DINA
The Spanish warrant explains several of the techniques used by the
DINA. The most frequently used technique was called "the grill."' 67 The
grill entailed a victim being laid naked on a metal table with electric
shocks being applied to the lips, genitals, wounds or metal prosthesis.
68
Another method of torture alleged in the warrant involves two friends or
relatives being placed in metal drawers one on top of the other, so that
while the one above was being tortured, the other person would experi-
ence the psychological impact. 69 Other methods included hanging persons
by their wrists and/or knees while electric currents were applied or beat-
ings administered, placing a bag over a person's head until the victim
61. Jose Zalaquett, Introduction to REPORT, supra note 46, at xxv.
62. Id. During the 1980's a small number of groups formed in opposition to the mil-
itary government. These groups resorted to violent acts against the government but met
with little success. As a result of such groups, the government felt the newly organized
DINA, then called the CNI, was justified in its goal of fighting subversive enemies. A
new onslaught of human rights violations were committed as the government pressured
the CNI to "get results" through repression. Id. at 71.
63. Id. at 82.
64. Id.
65. Snyder, supra note 44, at *8-*9. When the DINA gained unfavorable attention
from the United States it was deconstructed and a new agency, called the National Center
of Information, took its place. This new version of the DINA engaged in more subtle
means of accomplishing its goals. Whereas the DINA would seize people in broad
daylight, the National Center of Information adopted more subversive tactics. See also
Quinn, supra note 45, at 912-13.
66. Quinn, supra note 45, at 916.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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was close to suffocation, administering drugs, and throwing boiling water
on others.70 The agents of the DINA were specially trained in the torture
techniques that were applied to victims in the secret torture chambers
that existed in Chile, where hooded doctors were present to ensure that
victims did not die before the DINA wanted them to.71
The warrant accused Pinochet of using his power as the head of the
State to commit such atrocities.72 It is also alleged that the killings and
disappearances took place abroad, as well as in Chile.73 The warrant did
not allege that General Pinochet personally participated in the kidnap-
ping, hostage-taking, or torture of anyone. 74 Rather, it has been alleged
that the agency charged with these atrocities was directly answerable to
Pinochet and that it was Pinochet who ordered the human rights viola-
tions committed by the DINA.75
C. The Amnesty Law
There has been virtually no redress for the victims of Pinochet's
military junta due to the Amnesty Decree passed in 1978.76 This was ac-
complished through Decree Law No. 2191, which was allegedly issued in
furtherance of "the ethical imperative to make all efforts conducive to
strengthening the bonds uniting the Chilean nation, leaving behind ha-
treds that are meaningless today, and encouraging all those initiatives that
might solidify the reunification of Chileans" .77 Amnesty was thus guaran-
teed to anyone who had committed criminal acts, been accomplices to, or
helped to cover up such acts while the state of siege was in effect, from
September 11, 1973 until March 10, 1978.78 In further frustration of at-
tempts to seek redress for the human rights violations committed by Pi-
nochet's regime, the Chilean courts interpreted the amnesty law to pro-
hibit investigations involving the events covered by the decree.79 This left
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. ex parte Pinochet 1998, supra note 10, at 1503.
75. Id. at 1503-1504.
76. Reprinted in Diario Oficial on April 19, 1978. For the definition of amnesy, see
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 83 (61h ed. 1990); "Included in the concept of pardon is am-
nesty, which is similar in all respects to a full pardon, insofar as when it is granted both
the crime and the punishment are abrogated; however, unlike pardons, an amnesty usually
refers to a class of individual situations."
77. REPORT, supra note 46, at 89.
78. Id. Amnesty was not extended to anyone involved with the murder of Orlando
Letelier and Ronnie Moffit that occurred in Washington D.C. Id.
79. Id. at 125. The courts chose to completely disregard Article 413 of the Code of
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many questions that the courts had begun to deal with involving the cir-
cumstances surrounding alleged violations of human rights, as well as" the
guilt or innocence of victims and perpetrators, unanswered. 80 As a result,
offenses that would be protected by the Amnesty Decree are being chal-
lenged in international law.8'
D. The Violation of International Agreements
Even though domestic criminal proceedings seemed an unpractical
response to the atrocities committed by Pinochet's military regime, the
international community still had the option of prosecuting such acts be-
cause they violated several international agreements which Chile had en-
tered into.
1. United Nations Convention for the Prevention of Torture
and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
The United Nations Convention for the Prevention of Torture and
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment was adopted by the Gen-
eral Assembly on December 10, 1984.82 Subsequently, the Consultive As-
sembly of the Council of Europe adopted a recommendation similar to
the U.N.'s convention with the addition of a proposed optional protocol
which was not included in the final draft adopted by the U.N.83 The Eu-
ropean Convention was adopted on June 26, 1987, and it was opened for
signature by the member states on November 26, 1987.84
The Convention, which came into force in 1987, contains the most
expansive jurisdictional provision for human rights violations.8S Four ju-
risdictional bases are permitted under the treaty: (1) jurisdiction based on
wrongs occurring within the territory of the forum state, (2) jurisdiction
Criminal Procedure that exists in Chile. This article orders that "a definitive halting of
procedures cannot be rendered until the investigation that seeks to determine the facts of
the case and the identity of perpetrator has been exhausted". Id.
80. Id. The REPORT also points out that several troops who were unjustly accused of
committing human rights violations have not been able to clear their names. Id. at 125-
126.
81. Robert J. Quinn, supra note 46, at 907.
82. COUNCIL OF EUROPE: EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR THE PREVENTION OF TORTURE
AND INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT, Nov. 26, 1987, 27 I.L.M. 1152
(1988).
83. Id. Costa Rica had submitted a draft optional protocol to the U.N which con-
tained preventive measures similar to the one adopted by the Council of Europe. These
were not included in the U.N. final draft. Id.
84. Id. This note focuses on the ratification of the Convention by the United King-
dom on June 24, 1988. Id.
85. Hari M. Osofsky, Note, Domesticating International Criminal Law: Bringing
Human Rights Violators to Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 191, 197 (1997).
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based upon the offender being a national of the forum state, (3) jurisdic-
tion based upon the victim being a national of the forum state, and (4)
jurisdiction based upon the offender's presence in the forum state in the
absence of extradition. 86
2. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages
Recognizing the taking of hostages as a "grave concern of the inter-
national community", the United Nations International Convention
against the taking of hostages established hostage taking as a form of in-
ternational terrorism and advanced the proposition that any person who
commits such an act should be prosecuted or extradited.87 The Conven-
tion holds accountable anyone who commits such an act or any accom-
plice of one who commits or attempts to commit an act of hostage
taking.88
3. Applicable United Kingdom Statutes State Immunity Act
of 1978
The United Kingdom's State Immunity Act of 1978 was enacted by
Parliament to modify and apply art. 39(2) of the Vienna Convention to
the United Kingdom. 9 This modification permits a former head of state
to invoke sovereign immunity to avoid criminal prosecution in the United
Kingdom for acts performed in the his functions as the head of stateY0
Thus, under English law, a former head of state is immune from criminal
prosecution so long as the acts being called into question were performed
86. Id.
87. UNITED NATIONS: INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION AGAINST THE TAKING OF HOS-
TAGES, G.A. Res. 34/146, U.N. GAOR 61h Comm., 34"' Sess., U.N. Doc. A/C.6/34/L.23
(1979). This note uses the definition of hostage taking established by the Convention:
Any person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure or to continue to detain
another person (hereinafter referred to as the "hostage") in order to compel a third party,
namely, a State, an international intergovernmental organization, a natural or juridicial
person, or a group of persons, to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or im-
plicit condition for the release of the hostage commits the offence (sic) of taking of hos-
tages ("hostage-taking") within the meaning of this Convention. Id. at art.1.
88. Id. at art. 1 § 2.
89. ex parte Pinochet 1998, supra note 10, at 1499. Art. 39(2) of the Vienna Con-
vention: When the functions of a person enjoying privileges and immunities have come to
an end, such privileges and immunities shall normally cease at the moment when he
leaves the country, or on expiry of a reasonable period in which to do so, but shall sub-
sist until that time, even in the case of armed conflict. However, with respect to acts per-
formed by such a person in the exercise of his functions as a member of the mission im-
munity shall continue to subsist. Id. at 1499.
90. Id. § 20 of the State Immunity Act replaces the words "as a member of the mis-
sion" in the Vienna Convention with "as head of state". Id.
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in his function as the head of state.91
4. The Taking of Hostages Act of 1982
Parliament enacted the Taking of Hostages Act of 1982 to imple-
ment the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages of
1979.92 The Act does not define hostage-taking as a crime which can
only be committed by a public official, but neither does it preclude such
an application. 93 The definition of hostage-taking under § 1 applies the of-
fense to;
"A person, whatever his nationality, who, in the United Kingdom
or elsewhere, - (a) detains any other person ("the hostage"), and
(b) in order to compel a State, international governmental organi-
sation [sic] or person to do or abstain from doing any act, threat-
ens to kill, injure, or continues to detain the hostage." '94
5. Criminal Justice Act of 1988
The United Nations Convention for the Prevention of Torture and
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment was implemented by
Parliament in § 134 of the Criminal Justice Act of 1988.95 This section
establishes that;
"A public official or person acting in an official capacity,
whatever his nationality, commits the offence of torture if in the
United Kingdom or elsewhere he intentionally inflicts severe pain
or suffering on another in the performance of his official
duties." '
96
The Act permits the same expansive jurisdictional bases that are permit-
ted by the Torture Convention.97
Section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act was invoked for the first
time in 1994 when Scotland Yard investigated torture claims against Pi-
nochet. 98 Evidence of the alleged torture was submitted by Amnesty In-
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1498. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
93. See id.
94. Id. at 1496.
95. See id. at 1502.
96. Id. at 1496.
97. See id. at 1502. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
98. Scotland Yard Investigating Pinochet Torture Claims, THE GUARDIAN, Jun. 15,
1994, at 8.
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ternational to the Yard while Pinochet was in England during an arms-
buying mission.99 The investigation could not be completed because Pi-
nochet left England and therefore, was no longer within the jurisdiction
of section 134 .100
V. Ex PARTE PINOCHET - THE LAW LORDS' STRUGGLE
A. The Decision of the Law Lords
On November 25, 1998, the British House of Lords held that Au-
gusto Pinochet Ugarte was not immune from criminal prosecution in En-
gland under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.'0' A month earlier the
Divisional Court had quashed a Spanish warrant which was issued pursu-
ant to § 8(b)(i) of the Extradition Act of 1989 for the extradition of Pi-
nochet on the grounds that the allegations made in the warrant were acts
committed by Pinochet as the Head of the State of Chile, therefore enti-
tling him to sovereign immunity. 0 2 According to Lord Chief Justice
Thomas Bingham, "[a] former head of state is clearly entitled to immu-
nity for criminal acts committed in the course of exercising public func-
tions" .103 In acknowledgment of the public and international importance
of the issue, the lower court granted British prosecutors leave to appeal
to the House of Lords. 104
The House of Lords held that Pinochet was not entitled to sovereign
immunity as a former head of state from the criminal processes of the
United Kingdom, of which extradition is a part. 0 5 First, the court found
the case to be justiciable in the United Kingdom. 10 6 Although the early
common law act of state doctrine rendered acts of sovereigns non-
justiciable, the Law Lords found a clear intent on the part of Parliament
that the courts of England should hear and decide cases involving human
rights violations. 07 Second, the court held that §20 of the State Immunity
Act of 1978108 extends immunity to acts of heads of state performed in
99. The Criminal Justice Act allows for prosecution of torture occurring in the
United Kingdom or elsewhere, as long as the accused is in Britain. Pinochet could have
faced life imprisonment under the statute. Id.
100. Id.
101. Pinochet Isn't Saved, THE NEW YORK TIMEs, Oct. 30, 1998, at 8.
102. ex parte Pinochet 1998, supra note 10, at 1496.
103. Pinochet Wins First Round of British Court Battle, CNN Interactive, Oct. 28,
1998.
104. Id.
105. ex parte Pinochet 1998, supra note 10, at 1502.
106. Id. at 1498.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1499. § 20 of the State Immunity Act reads, in pertinent part:
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the exercise of functions of the state which are recognized by interna-
tional law."° Since kidnapping, hostage-taking, and torture are not func-
tions of a head of state recognized by international law, immunity cannot
be extended to cover such acts.110 And third, the court held that although
a type of residual immunity can be applied to acts of former heads of
state performed while he was still the head of state, Pinochet cannot
claim such immunity.'
The Law Lords held that kidnapping, torture, and hostage-taking
could never be considered as functions of a head of state that would give
rise to sovereign immunity." 2 Sovereign immunity was designed to pro-
tect actions taken by heads of state which could be considered wrongful
or illegal by the laws of his own state or those of other states." 3 But
hostage-taking, kidnapping, and torture are not acceptable forms of con-
duct on the part of anyone, especially heads of states and any holding to
the contrary would make a mockery of modern international law. 114 In
addition, the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment" 5 and the Convention Against the
Taking of Hostages ' 6 expressly give states the right, in fact makes it a
duty, for states to prosecute such crimes against humanity whenever they
occur. "17
(1) Subject to the provisions of this section and to any necessary modifications, the
Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964 shall apply to - (a) a sovereign or other head of
state; (b) members of his family forming part of his household; and (c) his private
servants, as it applies to the head of a diplomatic mission, to members of his fam-
ily forming part of his household and to his private servants . . . (5) This section
applies to the sovereign or other head of any state on which immunities and privi-
leges are conferred by Part I of this Act and is withour prejudice to the applica-
tion of that Pert to any such soveriegn or head of state in his public capacity.
Id. at 1492 (quoting the State Immunity Act of 1978, 10 Halsbury's Statutes, 41h Edition,
1997 reissue, 757).
109. See id. at 1500.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1501.
112. Id at 1500. Lord Steyn's opinion established a two part test to determine when
the statutory immunity could be applied. The act being questioned must be such "(1) that
the defendant is a former head of state . . . and (2) that he is charged with official acts
performed in the exercise of his functions as a head of state . . . ". Pinochet fails to
meet the second prong of this test because the acts that he is accused of do not fall
within the functions of a head of state. Id. at 1502-1503.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1500.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 73-77.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 78-79.
117. ex parte Pinochet 1998, supra note 10, at 1500.
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A new twist was added to the controversy when it was discovered
that one of the Law Lords had close ties to one of the intervening
groups, Amnesty International." 8 A panel of five Law Lords reversed it-
self on the grounds that Lord Hoffman's failure to reveal his association
with Amnesty International gave an appearance of a conflict of inter-
est." 9 In an effort to avoid further embarrassment and to add legitimacy
to the rehearing, the Law Lords increased the number of judges who are
to hear the case from five to seven.1 20
VI. THE LEGAL HISTORY EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF THE ACT OF STATE
DOCTRINE
As pointed out in Lord Nichols' opinion in Ex parte Pinochet, the
act of state doctrine developed as a common law principle in the nine-
teenth century.' One of the most widely cited cases to this effect is Un-
derhill v. Hernandez.122 Chief Justice Fuller defined the act of state im-
munity in Underhill as a rule of international law under which "every
sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other sov-
ereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the
acts of the government of another done within its own territory" .123 This
dicta from Underhill suggested that the act of state immunity was a rule
of international law. 24
Another early nineteenth century case that has been widely cited in
support of the act of state doctrine is The Schooner Exchange v. Mac
Faddon.25 This U.S. Supreme Court case established the act of state doc-
trine as a rule of absolute immunity. 26 It was held that when a foreign
118. Cullen, supra note 14.
119. Id. The Law Lords did not consider the option of simply removing Lord Hoff-
man's vote. This would have made the decision 2-2 and Pinochet would have won as a
result of the draw. Only the option of reversal and thus a possible rehearing was consid-
ered. Joanna Bale, Law Lord's Link With Amnesty 'Led to Bias Risk', THE TIMES
(London), Dec. 16, 1998.
120. John Mason, Law Lords to Boost Numbers for Pinochet Hearing, FINANCIAL
TIMES (London), Jan. 13, 1999, at 5.
121. See ex parte Pinochet 1998, supra note 10, at 1498.
122. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
123. Id. at 253 (dictum).
124. See id. See also ex parte Pinochet 1998, supra note 10, at 1498.
125. 11 U.S. 116 (1812).
126. Id. It has been argued that a careful reading of the case does not support this
assertion. This alternative argument is that the decision holds that a sovereign has exclu-
sive jurisdiction over his state unless this right is waived either implicitly or explicitly for
the benefit of a foreign state. Andrea Bianchi, Overcoming the Hurdle of State Immunity,
in ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGrrs IN DOMESTIC COURTS 405, 409 (Benedetto
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sovereign enters a state with the express or implied consent of the state,
it is universally understood that he is not subject to the jurisdiction of
that state. 127 To do so would be incompatible with his dignity as a for-
eign sovereign and the dignity of his nation. 128
A. Modern Development of the Act of State Doctrine
The more recent cases concerning the act of state doctrine reveal
that it has evolved into a domestic rule of law, rather than an interna-
tional rule of law.129 There is now recognition that certain questions per-
taining to acts of states are not justiciable and that judicial intervention
may reach beyond the authority of the judiciary into the realm of execu-
tive or legislative authority regarding foreign affairs. 130 Courts began in
the 1980s to move away from the absolute rule of sovereign immunity to
a more restrictive view.'3'
B. The Theory that Acts of State are Non-Justiciable
The U.S. Supreme Court held in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabba-
tino,132 that the judiciary would not inquire into the taking of property
within its own jurisdiction by a foreign sovereign, in the absence of a
treaty or other agreement regarding controlling legal principles, even if
there is a violation of international law. 133 In Banco, the court held that
the act of state doctrine prohibited an inquiry into the validity of a Cuban
expropriation decree because to do so would allow the United States to
sit in judgment upon the validity of an act of Cuba done within its own
territory. 34 Relying on earlier caselaw, the Supreme Court found that the
act of state doctrine is applicable even in situations where there has been
a violation of a customary rule of international law.135 A holding to the
Conforti and Francesco Francioni eds., 1997).
127. McFaddon, 11 U.S. at 139.
128. Id. at 139.
129. See e.g. Buttes Gas and Oil Co. v. Hammer and Others (No 3), [1980] 3 All
ER 475, [1981] QP. 223 Occidental Petroleum Corporation v. Buttes Gas and Oil Co. and
Others (No 2), [1980] 3 All ER 475, [1981] QB 223; Hesperides Hotels Ltd v. Muf-
tizade, [1978] 2 All ER 1168, [1979] AC 508; Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
376 U.S. 398 (1964).
130. ex parte Pinochet 1998, supra note 10, at 1498.
131. See generally, Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. 428 (1989);
Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349 (1993); Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argen-
tina, 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992).
132. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
133. Id. at 428.
134. Id. at 424.
135. Id. at 431. See also; Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897); Oetjan v.
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contrary was found to allow for possible embarrassing situations in
which a conflict could exist between the will of the Executive branch
and a decision of the Judicial branch. 136
The House of Lords rejected an application of the act of state doc-
trine in Buttes Gas and Oil Co. v. Hammer.137 The controversy in Buttes
arose out of a territorial dispute between Sharjah and Umm al Qaiwain
over the territorial rights to a certain body of water. 138 Both of the adja-
cent sovereign states had their foreign relations conducted by the United
Kingdom under treaty.139 Problems developed when both states granted
oil concessions to two different American oil companies, Buttes and Oc-
cidental, over the same strip of water. 40 Both of the concessions were
approved by the United Kingdom.' 41 When Occidental discovered oil the
two companies each claimed exclusive right to the area below the water,
relying on their respective concessions. 42 The ruler of Sharjah, in support
of Buttes' claim, produced a decree that was published in 1970 that he
claimed to have issued in 1969, which stated that the water was within
Sharjah's jurisdiction. 4 A representative of Occidental then publicly al-
leged that Sharjah and Buttes had conspired to backdate the decree. 44
Buttes then filed a suit for defamation claiming that they had been slan-
dered and Occidental counterclaimed for damages resulting from fraudu-
lent conspiracy and sought certain documents from Shrajah during
discovery. 14
The House of Lords would not permit the discovery, finding that to
Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918); Ricaud v. American metal Co., 246 U.S. 304
(1918); Shapleigh v. Mier, 299 U.S. 468 (1937).
136. Banco, 376 U.S. at 432-433.
137. Buttes Gas and Oil Co., 3 All ER at *10.
138. The dispute arose over the island of Abu Musa. Sharjah claimed to have terri-
tory over the water extending 12 miles around the island. Umm al Qaiwain claimed that
Sharjah's territory was limited to 3 miles around Abu Musa. Id at *10.
139. Id.
140. Umm al Qaiwain granted an oil concession to Occidental which included Umm
al Qaiwain's territorial waters as extending up to 3 miles around Abu Musa. Sharjah
granted an oil concession to Buttes over its territorial waters, which Sharjah believed to
include 12 miles around the island of Abu Musa. Id at *2.
141. The United Kingdom believed that Sharjah had sovereignty over the island of
Abu Musa and up to 3 miles around it. But the agreement between Sharjah and Buttes
did not explicitly say this. It only said that Buttes would have access to the island and its
territorial waters. There was no definition of what the territorial waters included. Id.
142. Id.
143. The significance of the decree is that if it was in fact issued in 1969, it pre-
dated Occidental's concession agreement with Umm al Qaiwain. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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do so "would be contrary to the comity of nations".146 Lord Denning
found the charge of conspiracy to require a judicial inquiry into the legis-
lative capacity of the ruler of Sharjah.' 47 It was emphasized that the court
was dealing with a sovereign, and not an ordinary citizen who could be
joined as a necessary and proper party to the action. 48 The ruler was
held to be entitled to claim sovereign immunity because his conduct in
the realm of international relations and his legislative capacity had been
called into question. 149 Finally, Lord Denning articulated a theory of judi-
cial restraint for situations where, as in the Buttes case, the dispute is so
intertwined with "the comity on which sovereign immunity is founded"
such that the controversy is "politically sensitive". 50 Judicial self-
restraint was relied on by the court rather than the traditional act of state
doctrine.151
C. The Restrictive v. Absolute Theory of Sovereign Immunity
In 1989, the United States Supreme Court addressed the restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity when it held in Argentine Republic v.
Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.' that sovereign immunity would automat-
ically apply to acts of state unless there was an exception to such immu-
nity laid out in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act [hereinafter
FSIA].153 The court notes that the FSIA was enacted as a codification of
the new restrictive theory of sovereign immunity that had become widely
146. Id. at *3.
147. Id. at *9.
148. Id.
149. Id. at *10.
150. Id. The court also noted that Occidental had begun hundreds of suits against
Buttes in the United States as a result of the facts stated in this case. All of these actions
were stayed because the United States courts would not hear them. Id. at *9.
151. Id. at *10. Lord Denning relied on a statement made by the legal advisor to the
Department of State in Washington urging rejection of the act of state doctrine and that
the courts refrain from deciding any case between Buttes and Occidental arising from the
concession agreements. He said: We do not believe that this judicial self-restraint should
turn on such analytical questions as whether the so-called Act of State doctrine which is
traditionally limited to governmental actions within the territory of the respective state
can apply to an exercise of disputed territorial jurisdiction. It rather follows from the gen-
eral notion that national courts should not assume the function of arbiters of territorial
conflicts between third powers even in the context of a dispute between private parties.
Id.
152. 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
153. § 1604 of the FSIA states that "subject to existing international agreements to
which the United States [was] a party at the time of the enactment of this Act[,J a foreign
state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the
States except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter". Id at 434.
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accepted in international law. 54 The restrictive theory allows foreign
states to be brought up on civil charges for their commercial acts but not
for their public acts. 155
The Supreme Court again reaffirmed the restrictive theory when it
held that the recruitment and hiring of a United States citizen did not fall
within the meaning of commercial activity under the FSIA. 56 In Saudi
Arabia v. Nelson, it was alleged that the plaintiff Nelson was recruited to
work at a hospital in Saudi Arabia.'57 After taking the job, Nelson alleges
that he was arrested and tortured for reporting safety defects that existed
in the hospital. 5 8 The Supreme Court refused to hear the case, granting
immunity to Saudi Arabia because the acts alleged were jure imperii
(public acts) rather than jure gestionis (private or commercial acts). 159
The restrictive theory was explained as creating an exception for immu-
nity for private acts of the government that are the kinds of activities that
could be carried on by private individuals. 16° The Supreme Court empha-
sized that the conduct called into question by Nelson was the exercise of
the police power of Saudi Arabia.' 6' The police power of a sovereign as
applied to the restrictive theory of immunity, has always been viewed as
particularly sovereign in nature, even when there has been an abuse of
such power.1 62
VII. ANALYSIS
The early act of state doctrine was virtually a rule of absolute im-
munity. 63 Such a strict application of the doctrine could allow the immu-
nity to be invoked even for a state's violations of international law.' 64
This would create quite a paradox, because the doctrine of state immu-
nity exists in international law to prevent abuses against states. To allow
a rule of absolute immunity would then permit violations of international
law to go unpunished, to a large extent defeating the original purpose of
154. Id. at FNI; see Siderman de Blake v. The Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699
(9th Cir. 1992).
155. Id.
156. Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349 (1993).
157. Id. at 352.'
158. Id.
159. Id. at 359-360.
160. Id. at 360.
161. Id. at 361.
162. Id.
163. Andrea Bianchi, supra note 126, at 410.
164. Id.
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the doctrine to prevent abuses. 165 Instead of protecting states from abuses,
a rule of absolute immunity would allow states to violate human rights
with no threat of being held responsible for such violations.
This does not mean to say that the act of state doctrine should be
abolished altogether. Any discussion concerning state sovereignty must
first recognize that its legitimate continued existence is not changed by
the new dynamics of the world community.166 Since Chief Justice Mar-
shall defined the principle of absolute sovereign immunity in Schooner
Exchange v. McFaddon 67, it has been an essential principle of interna-
tional law.168 Although legitimate, the act of state doctrine should be
modified when its application would permit serious human rights viola-
tions. There are several ways that have been, or should be, utilized to
prevent sovereign immunity from having the effect of permitting abuses
of human rights.
A. The Trend Towards Applying the Act of State Doctrine to Inter-
national Aagreements
The House of Lords in Ex parte Pinochet, held any discussion of
the act of state doctrine to be irrelevant to its decision due to the clear
intention of Parliament that human rights violations should be justiciable
in the courts of the United Kingdom. 169 Parliament had enacted the Crim-
inal Justice Act of 1988170 and the Taking of Hostages Act of 1982171,
both of which allow an investigation by the United Kingdom into official
acts of foreign countries that relate to torture and hostage taking. 172 All
of the early caselaw concerning the act of state doctrine was held to be
superseded by international agreements and statutes, showing a contrary
intent of Parliament. 173
In addition, ex parte Pinochet was distinguished from the previous
caselaw of the United Kingdom and the United States because it is a
criminal proceeding, rather than a civil proceeding. 174 Thus, even though
the weight of authority seemed to allow the grant of immunity to Pi-
165. Id.
166. John A. Perkins, Essay: The Changing Foundations of International Law: From
State Consent to State Responsibility, 15 B.U. Int'l L.J. 433, 452 (Fall 1997).
167. See supra notes 125-128 and accompanying text.
168. Perkins, supra note 166, at 452.
169. ex parte Pinochet 1998, supra note 10, at 1498.
170. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
172. ex parte Pinochet 1998, supra note 10, at 1498.
173. Id.
174. Id.
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nochet, these cases correctly were not followed by the House of Lords
because all involved civil proceedings against the state. 75
The Law Lords' decision is consistent with the current trend in the
world community of construing treaties and statutes to overcome immu-
nity for violations of international law. 176 The treaty exception has most
notably been adopted by the United States, which subjects claims to im-
munity to treaties and international agreements to which it is a party.177
The theory behind the exception is that immunity should not be permit-
ted when the forum jurisdiction is a party to an international agreement
containing a provision that would conflict with a grant of immunity.'78
B. The Need for Criminal Prosecution
Since the post-World War II era the international community has
recognized crimes against peace, war crimes, crimes against humanity,
and genocide as international crimes. 179 Unfortunately, early treaties and
international agreements did not include expansive national jurisdiction
over these crimes. 180 In ex parte Pinochet, the House of Lords relied on
the Convention Against Torture, which mandates a much more expansive
bases for jurisdiction than did earlier treaties. 181 Beyond the Convention
Against Torture, international law currently recognizes universal jurisdic-
tion over several.abuses. 182
In light of the current trend towards applying treaties and statutes to
overcome immunity for violations of international law, criminal prosecu-
tion should be pursued by the international community whenever human
175. Id. See generally, Argentina v. Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. 428 (1989); Siderman
de Blake v. Argentina, 965 E2d 699 (9th Circ. 1992); Al Adsani v. Kuwait, 107 ILR 536
(1996).
176. Bianchi, supra note 166, at 421. Statutory construction has traditionally dictated
that a domestic statute be construed in a manner which does not conflict with interna-
tional law. This rule of construction has allowed courts to overcome immunity, especially
when it can be determined that international law does not require immunity to be ex-
tended for human rights violations. Id.
177. Id at 424.
178. Id. at 425.
179. Hari Osofsky, supra note 76, at 195. These crimes were established by the
Charter of the Military Tribunal, Aug 8, 1945,-59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 and the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948,
78 U.N.T.S. 277. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Hari Osofsky, supra note 85, at 198. It should be noted, however, that clear
consensus as to which abuses should invoke universal jurisdiction, exists only in regard
to a few abuses, most of which are mandated by treaty.
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rights violations occur.'83 It is important to note that the international
community is constrained by the treaties and international agreements
which define when human rights have been violated. But when such vio-
lations occur, international leaders are in a better position to effectively
bring about the prosecution of human rights violators than national lead-
ers in a transitional state.I 4
The benefits of a criminal proceeding cannot be achieved through
the creation of a truth commission. " While truth commissions offer a
more practical response in weak states that are subject to pressures from
a prior military regime, they do not satisfy the public's needs for punish-
ment and retribution.8 6 When serious violations of human rights are
committed, such as those committed by General Pinochet's military re-
gime, the need for punishment is greatly felt. In such situations, prosecu-
tion must be sought by the international community as a response.
8 7
C. The International Community Should Expand the Treaty Excep-
tion and Utilize Political Pressure to Advance the Prosecution
of Human Rights Violations
The traditional strict construction of the act of state doctrine has, in
the past, effectively blocked the prosecution of human rights violations.
1 88
The United States Supreme Court stated in Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino,8 9 that "the act of state doctrine is applicable even if interna-
tional law has been violated".19° Through international agreement and po-
litical leverage, the international community should take a more active
approach to human rights violations.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has called
into question the Supreme Court's ruling in Amerada Hess'91 that inter-
prets the treaty exception of the FSIA in a narrow light. 92 The Court of
183. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
184. Douglass Cassel, infra note 199, at 202.
185. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text. But see TRUTH COMMISSIONS: A
COMPARATIVE AssEssMNr, supra note 32, at 36 (1997) (arguing that criminal prosecution
may not be the preferred solution because cross-examination of a victim may not be in
the victim's best interest. A truth convention may better provide the victim with the resto-
ration of his human and civil dignity because truth conventions focus on the victim,
whereas criminal proceedings focus on the perpetrator).
186. See supra, notes 24-31 and accompanying text.
187. Steven Landsman, supra note 13, at 89.
188. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 123-137 and accompanying text.
190. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 431 (1964).
191. See supra notes 138-141 and accompanying text.
192. See Bianchi, supra note 166, at 428.
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Appeals grudgingly followed the Supreme Court's ruling in Siderman de
Blake v. The Republic of Argentina.193 As established by Amerada Hess,
a treaty exception would only apply when the treaty expressly conflicts
with the FSIA.194 The Court of Appeals treats this interpretation as the
creation of "a serious obstacle to claims that, by subscribing to a treaty
or other international agreement, a defendant loses its immunity under
the FSIA.195
One clear distinction between Amerada Hess and Siderman is the
conduct complained of. In Amerada Hess, the plaintiff's were suing for
damages from the destruction of a ship. 96 In stark contrast the 81 year-
old plaintiff in Siderman was suing for damages resulting from his ab-
duction by ten masked men working for the Argentine military who beat
him and tortured him with a caddle prod for seven days, while shouting
racial epithets at him.197 The treaty exception should be expanded in the
face of such brutal violations of human rights.
A state in Chile's situation is virtually incapable of prosecuting its
own human rights violations. 98 As was discussed earlier, pressure from
Pinochet and the military combined with the amnesty law have prevented
redress for the atrocities committed by the military junta. 9 Pinochet ef-
fectively prevented President Aylwin from touching "a single hair of a
single soldier" under the threat of the complete disintegration of the
democratic process. 20° A threat by Pinochet, while carrying much weight
in Chile, would be ineffective against a UN Secretary-General or a U.S.
President.20' Thus the international community is in a better position to
recognize and prosecute human rights violations than a weak state in a
transitional situation.20 2
This point is exacerbated when there is an amnesty law in effect.20 3
Such amnesty laws should be rejected by the international community. In
the face of such amnesty laws, nations should seek to insist on prosecu-
193. 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992).
194. Argentina v. Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. 428, 442 (1989) (emphasis added).
195. Siderman, 965 F.2d at 719.
196. 488 U.S. at 432.
197. 965 F.2d at 703.
198. Douglass Cassel, Accountability for International Crime and Serious Violations
of Fundamental Human Rights: Lessons from the Americas: Guidelines for International
response to Amnesties for Atrocities, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 197, 202 (1996).
199. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
200. Douglas Cassel, supra note 199, at 202.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 203.
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tion whenever possible.20" The United States, for example, has threatened
to withhold aid to Chile, El Salvador, and Guatemala to bring about
prosecutions of human rights violations. 20 5
VIII. CONCLUSION
The reversal of the Law Lords decision that Pinochet was not enti-
tled to sovereign immunity gives the general another chance at escaping
prosecution. 20 6 It also highlights the emergence of a new era for human
rights. Although parties to several international agreements have long
held the right to prosecute crimes committed against humanity, this right
has seldom been invoked.20 7 Prompted by the issuance of the Spanish
warrant for Pinochet's arrest, several other nations have taken steps to-
wards issuing their own arrest warrants, including France, Sweden, and
Switzerland. 208 Regardless of whether Pinochet ever stands trial for the
crimes he has committed, the international outcry for the extradition and
prosecution of Pinochet indicates a new allegiance to the protection of
human rights.20 9
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